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A NADIR OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE: FAILING TO
PROTECT TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS’ CHOICE
FOR A MORE PEACEFUL DEATH IN NEW
MEXICO
Kathryn L. Tucker*

I. INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently considered whether a dying
patient has a right protected by the New Mexico Constitution to choose a more
peaceful death via aid in dying. Physicians who care for patients with terminal
illnesses and a patient with a terminal illness claimed that this choice, one of the most
profoundly personal a person will make in a lifetime, was deserving of recognition
and protection under the New Mexico Constitution’s guarantees to liberty, happiness
and due process.1
The trial court, following trial, found that no right was more fundamental:
This Court cannot envision a right more fundamental, more private
or more integral to the liberty, safety and happiness . . . than the
right of a competent, terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying.
If decisions made in the shadow of one’s imminent death regarding
how they and their loved ones will face that death are not
fundamental and at the core of these constitutional guarantees,
[then] what decisions are?2

* Kathryn L. Tucker is Executive Director of the End of Life Liberty Project, an advocacy
organization dedicated to protecting and expanding the rights of the terminally ill, which she founded
during her tenure as Executive Director of the Disability Rights Legal Center, a leading disability rights
advocacy organization. Previously, Tucker served two decades as Director of Advocacy and Legal Affairs
for Compassion & Choices, engaging multidimensional advocacy to improve care and expand choice at
the end of life. Prior to that, she practiced law with Perkins Coie. She has held faculty appointments at
UC Hastings, Loyola/Los Angeles, the University of Washington, Seattle University, and Lewis & Clark
Schools of Law, teaching in the areas of law, medicine, and ethics pertinent to the end of life. A Fulbright
Specialist, she has held faculty appointments at the Universities of Auckland, Canterbury, and Otago in
New Zealand. Tucker is often involved in representing physicians and patients seeking to expand end of
life liberty, and served in this capacity in a number of the cases discussed herein, including Morris v
Brandenburg. This article was prepared in conjunction with the University of New Mexico School of Law
symposium, Establishing New Rights: A Look at Aid in Dying (September 23, 2017).
1. See N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 18.
2. Morris v. Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672997, at *7 (2d Jud. Dist. Ct.
N.M. Jan. 13, 2014) rev’d, Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564, aff’d, Morris v.
Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836.

315

316

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48, No. 2

The intermediate appellate court reversed in a fractured ruling with three
opinions.3 The New Mexico Supreme Court rendered a decision that failed to honor
the tradition of robust state constitutional jurisprudence in New Mexico,4 and
abdicated its responsibility to do an independent analysis, inappropriately deferring
to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States twenty years prior,
Washington v. Glucksberg.5
This article contends that the New Mexico Supreme Court erred in doing so
for two reasons. First, it was error to defer to a decision of the United States Supreme
Court where a claimed state constitutional right is at issue. Second, it is erroneous to
read Glucksberg as requiring, or even supporting, this outcome.
State high courts fail in their duty when they abdicate their responsibility to
identify and define the nature and scope of rights protected by the state constitution
on grounds that the United States Supreme Court has spoken on the matter through
the lens of federal constitutional jurisprudence. This failure was manifest in the
Morris decision. If State high courts, in conducting their independent analysis of
state constitutional provisions, choose to look to Glucksberg for whatever persuasive
value it might offer, those courts would still have no reason to view that decision as
creating a barrier to their recognition of a right to choose a more peaceful death via
aid in dying.
II. STATE HIGH COURT INTERPRETATION OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IS INDEPENDENT OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.
It is axiomatic that decisions of the United States Supreme Court “are not,
and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by
counterpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions are not
mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges . . . seriously err
if they so treat them.”6

3. See Morris, 2015-NMCA-100. Judge Garcia wrote the majority opinion; he did not reject
Petitioners’ claim entirely, acknowledging that aid in dying might qualify as an important right subject to
intermediate scrutiny. See id. ¶¶ 49–50. He deferred to the New Mexico Supreme Court, holding that it,
not the Court of Appeals, should decide the nature and scope of a state constitutional right in a case of
first impression. See id. ¶ 38. Judge Hanisee concurred in part, urging judicial abdication of the issue to
the legislative process. See id. ¶ 67 (Hanisee, J., concurring in part). Both ignored the record before the
court, and relied on the United States Supreme Court ruling in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997). Judge Vanzi, dissented, opining that terminally ill, competent patients should have a
constitutionally protected right to choose aid in dying. See id. ¶ 71 (Vanzi, J., dissenting). The divided
Court of Appeals did not express a majority view as to which level of scrutiny should apply.
4. See Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, 316 P.3d 865; State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046. 217
P.3d 1032; Montoya v. Ulivarri, 2007-NMSC-035, 163 P.3d 476; In re Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019,
134 P.3d 746; New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 975 P.2d
841; Oldfield v. Benavides, 1994-NMSC-006, 867 P.2d 1167; Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 1991-NMSC-101,
823 P.2d 299.
5. See Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 20–34.
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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It is up to the States to exercise their prerogative of developing their own
law. If State courts fail in that duty, they fail to safeguard the rights and protections
to which their citizens are entitled. “Whatever protections [state law] does confer are
surely disparaged when [a state court] refuses to adjudicate their very existence
because of the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution of the United
States.”7 State high courts can and should criticize United States Supreme Court
decisions, and recognize greater constitutional protections for their citizens under
their state constitution where appropriate.8
These principles are foundational to the proper functioning of state and
federal courts in exercising their very different respective sovereign powers.9 Failing
to observe these principles, the New Mexico Supreme Court held “We conclude that
Glucksberg controls.”10 While giving lip service to its ability to extend greater
protections,11 the Morris court went on to hold “we choose not to deviate from the
ultimate holding in Glucksberg.”12 Concluding: “the Glucksberg approach with
respect to physician aid in dying is not flawed.”13
The error of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s reasoning is apparent.
Consider, for example, the Morris court’s reliance on the state interest articulated in
Glucksberg in protecting vulnerable populations. Id. The uncontroverted record in
Morris established that there was no adverse impact on vulnerable populations when
aid in dying was available. Such evidence was not available to the Glucksberg court
because at that time there was no open practice. For the Morris court to suggest it
was following Glucksberg in part because it shared the concern about possible harm

7. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Murdock v.
Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626 (1875) (“The State courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has
repeatedly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or
otherwise.”).
8. See, e.g., Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State of Florida, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1251 (Fla. 2017)
(“[O]ur Supreme Court has clearly stated that federal law has no bearing on Florida’s more extensive right
of privacy.”).
9. These arguments are cogently set forth in an amicus brief filed in a case similar to Morris pending
in NY by a coalition of respected law professors at New York law schools. See Brief for Amici Curiae
New York Law Professors in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Myers v Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2017), 2017 WL 2837556. It is difficult to know the impact of amicus briefs; advocates
differ in their view of the benefit of pursuing amicus participation. Compare Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The
Utility of Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court’s Indian Cases, 2 AM. INDIAN L. J., 38, 45 (2013)
(“[A]micus briefs are not all that influential. . . . “), with Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH.
U. L. REV. 603, 603 (1984) (“Occasionally, a case will be decided on a ground suggested only by an
amicus, not by the parties. Frequently, judicial rulings, and thus their precedential value, will be narrower
or broader than the parties had urged, because of a persuasive amicus brief. Courts often rely on factual
information, cases or analytical approaches provided only by an amicus. A good idea is a good idea,
whether it is contained in an amicus brief or in the brief of a party.”), and Paul M. Smith, The Sometimes
Troubled Relationship Between Courts and Their “Friends”, 24 LITIG. 24, 26 (1998) (“Amicus briefs
influence courts to favor your side in lots of different . . . ways.”). Unfortunately, the New York Court of
Appeals made similar mistakes in Myers as are criticized herein. See Myers, 85 N.E.3d 57.
10. Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 31.
11. See id. (“We may diverge from the Glucksberg precedent if we determine that the federal analysis
is flawed or that New Mexico has distinct characteristics in the relevant area or that structural differences
between our government and the federal government exist.”).
12. Id.
13. Id. ¶ 33.

318

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 48, No. 2

to vulnerable populations made no sense at all in light of the record, which
established this concern had no foundation. Similarly, plaintiffs presented evidence
at trial showing that since aid in dying became available in Oregon, end-of-life care
improved in measurable ways: referrals to hospice care occur more often and earlier,
and palliative care and communication between patient and physician have
improved. All of these developments improve quality of life of patients with terminal
illnesses. The State presented no evidence at trial to demonstrate its concerns were
rationally related to a prohibition on aid in dying. Plaintiffs presented the New
Mexico Supreme Court with the most well-developed evidentiary record concerning
the practice of aid in dying in any litigation in the United States.14 As recognized by
the trial court, the record demonstrates the profoundly intimate nature of the decision
that was at issue, the safety of the practice, and that the practice benefits, rather than
harms, end-of-life care in general.
The Court made a pretense of independent analysis, stating “We agree
that . . . New Mexico has historically placed great importance on patient autonomy
and dignity in end-of-life decision-making.”15 It failed, however, to give this
heightened respect for end of life autonomy and dignity proper credence, asserting
that provisions of state law suggested “end-of-life decisions are inherently fraught
with the potential for abuse and undue influence”.16 Yet, as noted above, the record
established there has been no evidence of abuse or harm in jurisdictions where aid in
dying is openly available, and to the contrary measurable improvements occurred.
To suggest that the admittedly heightened respect for autonomy and dignity could
not be honored due to overriding concerns about abuse or harm was without any
evidentiary support.
In sum, there was no reason for the New Mexico Supreme Court to conclude
that the United States Supreme Court’s approach in Glucksberg was right for New
Mexico, especially in light of developments in both federal constitutional
jurisprudence and the facts pertinent to the practice of aid in dying in the two decades
since Glucksberg.
III. GLUCKSBERG PRESENTS NO BARRIER TO A STATE HIGH COURT
RECOGNIZING A PROTECTED INTEREST IN A DYING PATIENT’S
RIGHT TO CHOOSE A MORE PEACEFUL DEATH VIA AID IN DYING.
The Morris court relied on the twenty year old United States Supreme Court
holding in Glucksberg that a state’s ban on ‘assisted suicide’ did not violate due
process or equal protection guarantees under the federal Constitution.17 This reliance
was misplaced for multiple reasons.
Even had the New Mexico Supreme Court been bound by Glucksberg, that
decision presented no barrier to the supreme court finding a state constitutional right

14. See id. ¶¶ 3–13. Where plaintiffs have introduced such evidence and the state has presented none
to demonstrate its interest, the appropriate resolution is to strike down the challenged law, as was the case
in Gainesville Woman Care, LLC. See Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State of Florida, 210 So. 3d
1243, 1265 (Fla. 2017).
15. Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 36.
16. Id.
17. Id. ¶ 31
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to choose aid in dying. A painstaking review of the opinion makes this clear. Justice
Rehnquist delivered the Court’s opinion. In rejecting what it understood to be
plaintiffs’ facial challenge to Washington’s ban on assisted suicide and a
fundamental liberty interest in “a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right
to assistance in doing so,”18 the Glucksberg Court emphasized the states’
longstanding prohibition on assisted suicide, reflecting a “commitment to the
protection and preservation of all human life.”19 Because the right to “suicide” had
not been historically protected, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny.20 Pointing
to the state’s interests in life, preservation of the medical profession, prevention of
suicide generally, protection of vulnerable groups, and avoidance of euthanasia, the
Court found those interests were reasonably related to its prohibition against assisted
suicide.21
Though the Court declined at that time to extend federal constitutional
protection to aid in dying it invited states to address the issue: “Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality,
legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”22
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor made clear she joined the Court’s
rejection of the generalized right to commit suicide and did not reach the question of
“whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a
constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her
imminent death.”23 Further, Justice O’Connor left the question to the states for the
time being, explaining “the . . . challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures
for safeguarding . . . liberty is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the

18. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). A foundational error in Glucksberg was
the Court’s assumption that the choice of a mentally competent terminally ill patient for a more peaceful
death via aid in dying was a form of “suicide.” In the decades since Glucksberg many mental health,
medical, and public health professional associations, including most recently the American Association
of Suicidology, have explicitly recognized that the choice for aid in dying is no kind of “suicide.” See AM.
ASS’N OF SUICIDOLOGY, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SUICIDOLOGY: “SUICIDE” IS
NOT THE SAME AS “PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING” 1 (October 30, 2017), http://www.
suicidology.org/Portals/14/docs/Press%20Release/AAS%20PAD%20Statement%20Approved%2010.30
.17%20ed%2010-30-17.pdf (“The American Association of Suicidology recognizes that the practice of
physician aid in dying . . . is distinct from the behavior that has been traditionally and ordinarily described
as ‘suicide,’ the tragic event our organization works so hard to prevent.”); see also id. at 4 (“[S]uicide and
physician aid in dying are conceptually, medically, and legally different phenomena. . . . [W]e believe that
the term ‘physician-assisted suicide’ in itself constitutes a critical reason why these distinct death
categories are so often conflated, and should be deleted from use. Such deaths should not be considered
to be cases of suicide. . . . “) (emphasis in original). States that have enacted statutes permitting aid in
dying all explicitly provide that the conduct of a physician in providing aid in dying is not to be considered
“assisted suicide.” See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.18 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-48-121 (West 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-661.15 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
127.880 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5292 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.180
(West 2017).
19. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
20. See id. at 728
21. Id. at 728–733.
22. Id. at 735.
23. Id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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first instance.”24 Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, concurred in Justice O’Connor’s
opinion.
Justice Souter, concurred in the judgment, but for different cause. He
rejected the majority’s historically bound analysis of the right at issue, explaining
that “[t]he text of the Due Process Clause . . . imposes nothing less than an obligation
to give substantive content to the words ‘liberty’ and ‘due process of law.’”25 Instead
of narrowly seeking historical recognition of the right to suicide, Justice Souter
acknowledged the Court’s recognition of a liberty interest in bodily integrity in
Casey and others.26 Without reaching a determination of whether the right at issue
was fundamental, he found the State’s interest in preventing euthanasia, both
voluntary and involuntary, sufficient to reject the right to aid in dying at that time.
For Justice Souter the “substantiality of the factual disagreement” was controlling at
that time.27 “Since there is little experience directly bearing on the issue, the most
that can be said is that whichever way the Court might rule today, events could
overtake its assumptions, as experimentation in some jurisdictions confirmed or
discredited the concerns about progression from assisted suicide to euthanasia.”28
Justice Souter left the question to the states for time being.29
Justice Stevens concurred, but also wrote separately to explain that he
rejected the facial challenge to Washington’s ban, not the as-applied challenge before
this Court, and “that there is . . . room for further debate about the limits that the
Constitution places on the power of the States to [criminalize aid in dying].”30 As
such, Justice Stevens also rejected the majority’s historical approach to constitutional
analysis and did not preclude future constitutional claims.
Justice Breyer, concurring with Justice O’Connor, writing separately, also
rejected the strict, historical approach of the majority, but found the availability of
palliative sedation sufficient to mollify terminally ill patients who would prefer aid
in dying.31
Not only did a majority of the justices refuse to foreclose a future, federally
protected right to aid in dying, but all of the justices encouraged the states to address
the issue of aid in dying for themselves. Moreover, it is critical to appreciate that the
Glucksberg Court did not have evidence of the safe and beneficial practice of aid in
dying before it, which the Morris court did. Glucksberg can in no way be properly
understood to create a barrier to the New Mexico Supreme Court in recognizing aid
in dying as constitutionally protected under the New Mexico constitution in light of
all of this.

24. Id. at 737 (alterations in original) (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
25. Id. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 777.
27. Id. at 786.
28. Id. at 787.
29. Id. at 789.
30. Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring) see also id. at 741 (“But just as our conclusion that capital
punishment is not always unconstitutional did not preclude later decisions holding that it is sometimes
impermissibly cruel, so is it equally clear that a decision upholding a general statutory prohibition of
assisted suicide does not mean that every possible application of the statute would be valid.”).
31. Id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Moreover, the rigid historical analysis of substantive due process rights
exemplified in Glucksberg has since been abandoned.32 In the context of same-sex
marriage, the Obergefell court rejected a constitutional approach bound to historical
recognition of a right, holding that “[t]he identification and protection of
fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret the
Constitution.”33 In so doing, a court’s duty cannot be “reduced to any formula.”34
Instead, courts must “exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.”35 Though history
informs that inquiry, it does “not set its outer boundaries,” allowing us to learn from
it without the past dictating the present.36
Thus it is clear that the United States Supreme Court opinion in Glucksberg
ought present no barrier to a state high court finding a constitutional right under a
state constitution to a patient’s choice for a more peaceful death via aid in dying.
In addition, as noted above, a key underpinning of Glucksberg was the
dearth of information on whether an open practice of aid in dying would present
danger. The New Mexico Supreme Court considered the issue in a landscape rich
with data: in the two decades following Glucksberg an open practice of aid in dying
ensued, generating data demonstrating that no danger arises when patients are
empowered to choose a more peaceful death via aid in dying. Concerns that had
given the Glucksberg court pause were shown in Morris to be, in fact, not
concerning. The Morris trial court heard evidence presenting information that no risk
or harm arose in jurisdictions where aid in dying was openly available.
It would have been permissible for the New Mexico Supreme Court to look
to Glucksberg to consider whether its reasoning was persuasive. If a State high court
found Glucksberg persuasive, it would need to recognize that the United States
Supreme Court left the door open to finding federal constitutional protection for the
choice at issue. Further, it would need to take into account that the United States
Supreme Court’s jurisprudential process for considering fundamental liberties has
changed materially since Glucksberg, as reflected in Lawrence v. Texas37 and
Obergefell v. Hodges.38 In those cases the Supreme Court recognizes that
determining whether a right meriting protection as a matter of liberty or privacy
exists calls for consideration of evolving societal views.39

32. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
33. Id. at 2598.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
38. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
39. See id. at 2602 (“[Fundamental rights] rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” Drafters of the constitution
“did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.” Id. at
2598; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72 (“In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the
past half century are of most relevance here.”).
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Plaintiffs in Morris adduced evidence showing that support for aid-indying was growing.40 If the United States Supreme Court itself was faced today with
the issues that were presented in Glucksberg, it would have the benefit of extensive
evidence of this evolution. This evidence includes a growing number of states
adopting statutes permitting aid in dying; polls showing growing public support for
aid-in-dying; the adoption of policies by leading medical associations supportive of
aid-in-dying; positive experience with aid-in- dying in states where it is practiced,
and a body of data reflecting this experience; and developments in other countries
that have recognized the right of a patient to aid-in-dying.41 The record in Morris
contained such evidence and it would have reflected no conflict, indeed would have
been consonant, with the Glucksberg decision for the New Mexico Supreme Court
to recognize this. Unfortunately for the jurisprudence of the State, and the plight of
suffering dying patients in New Mexico, it failed to do so.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the New Mexico Supreme Court to extend protection under
the New Mexico Constitution to the choice of a competent dying patient for a more
peaceful death via aid in dying is troubling. The decision is of concern because it
rejects a right in an area of particular importance to liberty and may signal a retreat
from more extensive protection of liberty under the New Mexico Constitution. At
the very least, this ruling fails to live up to the broad interpretation of liberty under
the New Mexico Constitution articulated in earlier opinions of the New Mexico
Supreme Court. This is an important area of liberty—how much suffering to endure
before death—where the New Mexico Supreme Court had the opportunity to be a
national leader. The New Mexico Supreme Court could have found independent
rights under the state Constitution’s more expansive provisions than those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Unfortunately this did not occur.
Instead, the New Mexico Supreme Court inappropriately deferred to the United
States Supreme Court, misunderstood and misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision
it was ostensibly deferring to, and ignored the fact that the jurisprudential approach
utilized in Glucksberg has since been abandoned by the Supreme Court. The promise
of liberty under the New Mexico Constitution was not realized in the context of end
of life liberty, which undermines New Mexican constitutional jurisprudence and
leaves suffering dying patients without the autonomy to decide the profoundly
personal matter of how much suffering to endure before death. If there is any utility
in this opinion perhaps it will serve as an example of failed jurisprudence, an example

40. Evidence included various poll data. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of American Medical
Women’s Association, et al., Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836, 2015 WL
13049932. Providing another illustrative example, a Gallup Poll conducted in 2015 asked: “When a person
has a disease that cannot be cured and is living in severe pain, do you think doctors should or should not
be allowed by law to assist the patient to commit suicide if the patient requests it?” and found that despite
this pejorative characterization of aid-in-dying, 68% of the public supported it, and only 28% opposed.
Andrew Dugan, In U.S., Support Up for Doctor-Assisted Suicide, GALLUP (May 27, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/183425/support- doctor-assisted-suicide.aspx.
41. See, e.g., Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, para. 147 (Can.) (striking down Canada’s
assisted suicide statute as impinging on liberty).
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which any sister court considering this issue under its own constitution would be
wise to avoid.42

42. Perhaps one or more of the New Mexico Supreme Court judges will publicly acknowledge the
error of the decision, as retired United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell did regarding his
determinative vote in Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy. See Linda Greenhouse, Black Robes Don’t Make the Justice, but the Rest of the
Closet Just Might, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/us/black-robes-dont-make-the-justice-but-the-rest-of-the-closet-just-might.html. Such recognition of error can play an
important role in allowing an erroneous ruling to be overcome. For example, noted Harvard Law School
professor Laurence H. Tribe, who argued on behalf of Hardwick, has articulated in opinion that Powell’s
second thoughts could undercut the moral force of the opinion. Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing
Sodomy Law, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 1990), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1990/10/26/powell-regrets-backing-sodomy-law/a1ae2efc-bec6-47ec-bfb61c098e610c5b/?utm_term=.dae1dd95e754 (“The fact that a respected jurist who is indispensable to the
majority conceded that on sober second thought he was probably wrong certainly will affect the way that
future generations look at the decision[.]”)

